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Abstract 
Using a sample of UK mergers and acquisitions from 1985-2004, we show that equity 
over-valuation appears to play an important role in the determination of financing 
method.  Our results are broadly consistent with those theories based upon market 
over-valuation driving mergers and their financing, rather than a Q-theory 
explanation.  In some contrast to the US results of Dong et al (2006) we find that 
proxies for over-valuation appear to be the more persuasive explanation for 
acquisition behaviour in the UK.  We do not find any evidence to support the Q-
hypothesis.  Given the evidence in favour of valuation effects, we argue that a 
selection model is necessary in investigating the long run performance of acquirers.  
Taken together with results from a univariate analysis, such a model reveals some 
modest, but not overwhelming, support for the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) hypothesis. 
However, we are unable to conclude that managers are acting in the best interests of 
the shareholders by using over-valued equity to purchase relatively under-valued 
targets. 
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Stock market driven acquisitions versus the Q theory of 
takeovers – The UK evidence 
 
One of the more interesting theories to emerge from behavioural finance theorists in 
recent years has been that of market timing.  Loughran and Ritter (2000) advance a 
theory of what they term “behavioural timing” which suggests that managers may 
seek to exploit perceived misvaluations of their firm’s stock.  This exploitation could, 
for example, take the form of issuing either equity or debt depending on perceived 
relative cheapness, or timing the decision to launch an initial public offering (IPO).  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the financing structure of firms appears to be the 
result of past attempts to time the market.  Shleifer and Vishny (2003) extend this 
market timing idea to suggest that firms make stock-financed acquisitions when their 
equity is highly valued, and in particular when it is more highly valued than the 
target’s stock.  Underlying all of these theories is the notion that management 
perceives the firm’s stock to be misvalued by an inefficient market, and responds 
accordingly.  In each case, they will be acting rationally and in the interests of 
existing stockholders, but at the expense of either new stockholders or new 
debtholders.  For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2000) 
show that stock returns are low following the issue of equity, and it is well-
documented that stock returns are low following equity-financed acquisitions 
(Agrawal and Jaffe (2000); Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1995; Gregory, 1997; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).  A refinement of the theory of 
over-valuation driving mergers is found in Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004, 
henceforth RKV) where both bidders and targets have private information about the 
stand-alone values of their firms, but valuations have market-wide and firm-specific 
components.  Furthermore, the combination of these misvaluation effects means that 
the target cannot assess the true value of any synergies.  A key difference between the 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003, henceforth SV) and RKV models is that the latter assumes 
that target management acts rationally and in the interests of the shareholders, 
whereas in the SV model target management are either compensated or have short 
horizons leading to a preference for “selling out”. 
 
 3 
Our focus in this paper is on the acquisition decision in the UK.  SV point out that a 
management team in an over-valued company that pursues a stock-financed 
acquisition of a less over-valued target could be acting rationally, in that although 
stock returns will be low following the acquisition, they will nonetheless be higher 
than they would have been had management taken no action
1
.  In fact this will only be 
the case if management pursue an otherwise successful post acquisition strategy.  The 
somewhat mixed evidence from cash-financed acquisitions (e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe, 
2000) does not suggest that this can be entirely relied upon, for the UK at least.  
Furthermore, there are alternative actions available to management in the case where 
stock is over-valued.  They could, for example, simply issue equity, either to finance 
future investment or to retire debt.  This is potentially an important issue in framing 
the research design to address the Shleifer and Vishny hypothesis.  If one takes the 
view that an equity financed acquisition is the only way to exploit a perceived over-
valuation of stock, compared to an alternative of doing nothing, then the best research 
design is to compare a sample of stock-financing acquirers with a matched sample of 
equivalently-valued but non-acquiring firms.  This design is found in Ang and Cheng 
(2006).  In effect, the model employed assumes that the decision to acquire is 
endogenous, and simply the result of a market misvaluation that has arisen.  An 
alternative view is that the decision to acquire a firm is exogenous, and that it is the 
financing method, or possibly the timing of the takeover, that is endogenous to the 
misvaluation of the equity.  If one takes this second view, then the appropriate 
research design involves study acquiring companies, their financing choices, and the 
stock market performance following the acquisition decision.  This is the type of 
research design employed by Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) and is 
also the design followed here.  Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) also 
study the set of bidding firms, but using a decomposition of market-to-book ratio 
approach.   
 
In complete contrast to the market valuation models of mergers, under the Q-
hypothesis of acquisitions as described in Dong et al (2006), firms are highly valued 
because they are well-run and have high NPV opportunities.  Market values simply 
reflect growth opportunities and managerial ability.  There is no particular reason for 
                                                
1 The RKV model leads to a similar prediction.   
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high-Q firms to prefer equity financing, although as Dong et al (2006, p.753) note, 
bidders with strong growth opportunities may prefer to preserve cash or keep gearing 
low in order to fund opportunities in the future.  However, a critical difference 
between Q-theory and the valuation theories of mergers is that long run stock returns 
should be either positively related to, or unrelated to
2
 Q whilst they should be 
negatively related to “over-valuation”. 
 
We study the UK market for two reasons.  First, there is the usual (though nonetheless 
important) case for an out of sample test of the SV/RKV and Q hypotheses.  If market 
valuation effects drive acquisitions and their financing, then ceteris paribus, one 
should find the effect exists in markets outside the US.  However, markets have 
different ownership structures.  For example, Andre and Ben-Amar (2008) describe 
Canada as having highly concentrated ownership with dominant family shareholdings, 
whilst Gregory and Matatko (2005, Table 1) discuss the very different ownership 
structure that prevailed in US and UK markets between 1975-1995, noting that “The 
relative unimportance of individual investors in the UK throughout the sample period 
means that there is less likely to be an emphasis on cash as a form of payment in 
acquisitions”.  In terms of concentration of ownership, Stapledon and Bates (2002, 
Table 2) show  that the top twenty UK fund managers controlled 37.06% of the UK 
market by value as at the end of 1997, with the top three alone controlling just under 
11%. Such concentration may mean that, to some degree at least, target shareholders 
are less likely to have the motivations claimed by SV, and may also be less likely to 
suffer from the information asymmetry that drives the RKV theory.  In a concentrated 
market, we would also expect these fund managers to have a greater chance of 
identifying the market, sector and firm specific components of misvaluation identified 
in RKV.  In short, there are reasons to suppose that stock market valuation effects on 
mergers should be weaker in the UK than in the US.
3
  
 
The paper now proceeds as follows.  First, we describe the data set and the research 
method.  Second, we show how the data seem to be consistent with valuation effects 
influencing the form of payment.  Third, we confirm the well-established result that 
                                                
2
 Unrelated as if markets are efficient the reaction takes place on announcement. 
3
 However, note that Gregory (2000) finds no evidence that institutional shareholdings have an 
influence in determining the form of financing. 
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equity acquirers perform worse than cash-financing acquirers.  We also show that 
“highly valued” acquirers perform in a different fashion than “lowly-valued” 
acquirers, and that the form of financing is important in explaining this difference.  
We then go on to show that in a logit model which controls for factors that have been 
shown to influence the form of payment in UK studies, our proxies for valuation have 
a significant role to play in predicting the choice of financing method.    
 
Finally, having shown that our proxies for valuation influence financing choice, we 
argue that the correct analysis of announcement period and longer-term performance 
requires that a treatment effects model is employed.  We estimate such a model and 
show that there is some evidence to suggest that once the effect of valuation on 
financing choice is taken into account, there is at least some evidence to support the 
conjecture that SV “rational” equity financing acquirers seem to be acting in the 
interests of their shareholders.  However, we find no evidence in the performance 
analysis to support the Q-hypothesis. 
 
Data and Research Method 
Our sample is mainly drawn from the SDC-Platinum Database (Securities Data 
Company), from 1985 to 2004 (inclusive), but in the early years’ data are 
supplemented by the use of the Acquisitions Monthly AMDATA database.  We 
require both acquirer and target firms to be UK listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange, and for their monthly returns to be available on the London Business 
School Share Price Database (LSPD).  The accounting data used in this research come 
from DataStream, with missing values hand-collected where possible from the 
London Stock Exchange Official Year Book. In addition, the market capitalisation data 
are collected from the LSPD.  
 
We classify the sample according to the dominant method of payment.  In this respect, 
it should be noted that there is a key difference between takeovers in the UK and 
takeovers elsewhere.  In the UK, according to The City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, a share offer must be accompanied by a cash alternative offer if any shares 
have been purchased in the market for cash during the 12 months preceding the 
merger.  This cash alternative has to be set, as a minimum, at the highest price paid 
for any shares in the market in this period.  In practice, this means that a considerable 
 6 
number of UK takeovers are classified as shares and cash by SDC, when the reality is 
that many such takeovers are really stock financed deals with a regulatory cash 
alternative added on.  Cooke, Gregory and Pearson (1994) provide some evidence on 
the generally low take-up of such an alternative.  Accordingly, we use the following 
criteria to classify the method of payment: 
if the method of payment is 100% cash, or cash with a loan note alternative
4
, 
then it is a cash transaction;  
if the method of payment includes some portion of shares, then it is a share 
transaction; 
any alternative offers are classified as other.  
 
The total sample in this research is (initially) 805 acquisitions, with 251 being pure 
cash offers, 501 being share-offers and 53 deals being classified as “other”.   Given 
the paucity of information concerning the structure of the “other” bids
5
, we choose to 
drop these from the analysis and concentrate on the distinction between equity and 
cash bids, which is at the heart of the SV hypothesis.  For our initial univariate tests 
we require accounting data on earnings and book values for both acquirers and 
targets, in order to compute a residual income valuation (RIV), and we require at least 
the announcement month returns to be available for both acquirers and targets  which 
reduces our core sample to 611 matched pairs of acquirer and target firms.  As an 
alternative to the RIV, given the prevalence of dividend payment in the UK we also 
investigate our hypotheses using a dividend discount model (DDM).  This gives a 
sample of 541 acquirers and 538 targets.  Finally, we investigate a sub-sample for 
which IBES forecast data is available.  This allows us to investigate a sample of 454 
acquirers and 384 targets.   
 
For this sample of firms, we estimate valuation models, as described below, and 
announcement month and longer term abnormal returns.  Our model for abnormal 
returns is the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) model, with bootstrapped 
skewness adjusted t-statistics p-values calculated following Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
                                                
4 During the early years of our sample this was a common offer as the loan note alternative was a tax-
efficient form of payment for some private investors. 
5
 Where we are able to fully assess these bids, by cross-referencing to copies of Acquisitions Monthly, 
these typically involve equity like components, such as warrants or convertible loan notes.  
Nonetheless, because of the complexity of these deals, we exclude them from the analysis.  
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(1999).  We report these returns for up to 36 months post acquisition for acquirers, 
and up to 36 months pre-acquisition announcement month for both acquirers and 
targets.  Given the evidence in Loughran and Ritter (2000) we present results for 
returns benchmarked against ten size-based control portfolios.
6
  As in Lyon et al 
(1999), missing returns for firms lacking a full 36 months data are filled in with the 
size benchmark return. 
 
The characteristics of our initial sample are presented in Table 1.  We show acquiring 
firms characterised according to their size and book to market ratio (BTMV).  We use 
deciles for size classification, and quintiles for BTMV classification, with an 
additional group (F) for those firms with negative book-to-market ratios.  One striking 
characteristic from this table is that over one third of all equity financing acquirers are 
in the low (i.e. “glamour”) book to market quintile, with 58.6% being in the two 
“glamour” quintiles.  Not surprisingly, acquirers tend to be larger firms and this is 
particularly the case for cash acquirers. 
 
We start by valuing our acquirers and targets using two models.  Our first model is the 
residual income valuation (RIV) model used in both Ang and Chen (2006) and Dong 
et al (2006).  Those papers follow the Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999, henceforth 
LMS) version of the Peasnell (1982) model
7
 which requires a consensus analyst 
forecast of earnings and dividends to be available from IBES for three years ahead.  
Unfortunately, such forecasts are not available for the UK for the full period of our 
study (they start in 1987) and are somewhat patchy, and we find a large number of 
instances where forecasts are missing.  UK analysts typically only forecast two years 
ahead and this is reflected in the poor availability of third year forecasts.  We also find 
many examples of missing dividend forecasts.  Were we to rigidly insist on full 3 year 
forecasts of earnings and dividends, our sample would be reduced to less than 150 
target firms.  By contrast, one year ahead forecasts are far more common, and 92% of 
                                                
6 An earlier version of this paper used both size and size and book to market matching, finding little 
qualitative difference between the model, although abnormal returns tended to be more negative for the 
size-matched BHARs.  However, given our analysis here now reports results partitioned on book to 
market, we simply control for size in calculating BHARs. 
7 Often rather misleading referred to as the Ohlson (1995) model.  The Ohlson model is a special case 
of the Peasnell model where abnormal earnings are assumed to mean revert according to a particular 
pattern which Ohlson terms a “linear information dynamic”.  In fact, the Lee et al (1999) framework is 
a special case of the Ohlson model where abnormal earnings are assumed to be persistent (ω=1) and 
where the value of Ohlson’s “other information” variable is assumed to be zero. 
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firms that have a one year ahead forecast also have a two year one.
8
  Dividend 
forecasts are only available for 62% of the targets which have earnings forecasts.  
Accordingly, we need to modify the LMS model somewhat.  As all analysts’ forecasts 
are in nominal terms, we fill in missing second and third year forecasts by assuming 
earnings grow in line with inflation, plus a real growth term.  For real growth we take 
the long run UK average real earnings growth figure of 1.6% reported in Gregory 
(2007).
9
  For missing dividends, we assume that the dividend paid is the same as the 
latest financial year end pre-merger dividend.  We could, of course, assume a constant 
payout rate, but given the evidence on “sticky” dividends this is a not unreasonable 
assumption and, if earnings are rising, is more conservative than assuming a constant 
payout.
10
  The expected long term inflation rate (gt) at time t in the UK is calculated 
by using the difference
11
 between the yield on long-dated gilts (the UK equivalent of 
the long dated Treasury Bond) and the yield on long dated index-linked gilts (the UK 
equivalent of TIPS, which have been in existence in the UK since 1984).  Last, we 
model the growth in long term RI using one of two different alternatives.  In model 1, 
we assume that from year 3 to year 4, earnings and book values grow at a real rate of 
1.6% and that beyond that RI is constant in real terms.  In model 2 we assume that RI 
grows in line with inflation from year 3 onwards.  As Lundholm and O’Keefe show, 
assuming a given rate of RI growth is not the same as assuming that earnings and 
asset grow by this same rate from year n to year n+1 where n is the forecast horizon.  
We choose these two alternatives in order to measure the sensitivity of our modelling 
to changes in assumptions.
12
  Formally, if 3,1, ... ++ titi EPSEPS = are the consensus 
analyst’s forecast earnings per share for firm i 1 to 3 years ahead, Dit … Dit+3 the 
consensus forecast dividends, and Bit is the current book value per share for firm i, our 
models are: 
                                                
8 Note that even requiring any sort of forecast is not without cost.  As we show later, the subset of firms 
for which forecasts are available exhibit less negative long term abnormal returns than the full sample. 
9
 We do not believe that the absence of long run earnings forecasts for the UK should be a particular 
cause for concern. For the UK, Capstaff et al (1995) show that besides exhibiting bias, the consensus 
analyst forecast fails to out-perform a random walk model of earnings at horizons greater than 15 
months.  More generally, using US data Bulkley and Harris (1997) show that analysts’ long run 
earnings forecasts are so biased as to be employable in a successful contrarian investment strategy.   
10
 It is tempting to invoke dividend irrelevance, but whilst this applies in the long term, in the short 
term the assumed dividend has a modest impact on value, as it influences closing book value and hence 
the following periods’ RI. 
11
 (1 + nominal rate)/(1 + index-linked rate) -1 
12
 We also allow RI to grow by more than the inflation rate in sensitivity tests.  Whilst this changes the 
price-to-value ratios, our main results  remain unaffected. 
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In cases where the horizon value RI is negative, we replace the final RI terms in the 
equations for Models 1 and 2 above with zero, effectively assuming that at the end of 
the forecast period the firm is worth the closing book value implied by the short run 
earnings forecasts. 
 
To estimate the above model we need a cost of equity capital, kei.  Note that unlike 
Ang and Chen (2006) we do not employ a firm or an industry specific cost of capital.  
Fama and French (1997) express their disappointment at the instability of their own 
industry estimates, noting that “estimates of the cost of equity are distressingly 
imprecise”.  Gregory and Michou (2009) undertake a Fama and French (1997) type 
analysis for the UK, and in addition evaluate conditional and Cahart models.  They 
end up by concluding that “Overall, the picture that emerges from the UK research is 
every bit as bleak as that which emerges from the Fama and French US study”.  As 
such, we see little point in doing anything other than assuming that the long run real 
cost of equity capital is similar across all our firms.  Thus our estimate of the cost of 
equity capital, kei., only varies between firms because the expected inflation rate 
changes.  We choose a 5% real rate as being broadly consistent with long run 
estimates of the UK cost of equity given in Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2005), but 
we also sensitise our models by varying the cost of equity between 4% and 6% real.
13
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 We prefer to estimate the cost of equity directly, rather than estimate an equity risk premium.  The 
first reason is theoretical, in that as Jenkinson (1993) points out, the risk free terms in any CAPM need 
to be consistent.  As we effectively assume β=1 for all firms, this argument applies here.  Second, from 
 10 
Although the valuation ratios of course change, the inferences with regard to relative 
valuation do not. 
 
Note that in any attempt to conduct an RIV valuation using forecasts, the estimates 
obtained are sensitive to both the cost of capital and the long run earnings growth 
assumptions used.  One can “reverse engineer” an RIV model to extract an implied 
cost of capital (as, for example, in Claus and Thomas, 2001) or even jointly estimate 
the cost of capital and implied growth, as in Easton (2006), although his model cannot 
be applied at the level of the individual firm.  Easton (2006) also notes that these 
estimates of cost of capital are sensitive to long run growth assumptions and this point 
will, of course, be equally valid in the calculation of RIV.  We have to acknowledge 
that our models are limited in that they assume the same long run growth across all 
firms.  However, in the absence of any long run consensus earnings growth forecasts 
for individual firms in the UK, we can do little else.  Using realised long run average 
industry earnings growth estimates would be one possibility, but unfortunately this 
suffers from two flaws.  First, UK earnings were not clean surplus, or even close to 
being so, for most of our sample period.  Second, such an approach would give rise to 
hindsight bias in our valuations, which we seek to avoid. 
   
As we note above, to impose the requirement that a consensus analyst’s forecast be 
available reduces our sample considerably. Accordingly, we investigate two 
alternatives.  The first simply involves filling in all missing forecasts using the 
procedures described in the preceding paragraph.  In other words, in the absence of 
any analysts’ forecasts whatsoever, we simply assume a real growth in earnings of 
1.6%, but otherwise apply the models as described in (1) and (2) above.  These form 
model 3 and 4 respectively.  As a complete alternative, instead of using any forecasts, 
we simply assume that the current year’s abnormal earnings grow in line with long 
run inflation and therefore have zero real growth.  This is model 5.  As is well-known, 
the RIV model requires that earnings and book values are in “clean surplus” form.  
Whilst using forecasts of earnings (either from using our “fill in” procedure or by 
using actual analysts forecasts), the projections made are clean surplus by design. 
                                                                                                                                       
an empirical standpoint, Wright et al (2003) argue against the separate estimation of the risk free rate 
and an equity risk premium on the grounds that estimates of the return on equities exhibit more stability 
than estimates of the equity risk premium. 
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However, in Model 5 we have to use the year t-1 and year t accounting data RI for the 
firm, and this poses two problems.  The first is that UK earnings are not clean surplus 
in the period being studied.  Goodwill write-offs were common place (Gregory, 2000) 
and re-valuations of property (or real estate) assets took place on a regular basis.  In 
neither case did the adjustments flow through the income statement.  The second 
problem involves the issue of new equity.  Here, we apply the process suggested by 
Cohen, Polk & Vuolteenaho (2005), in which new equity issues are calculated from 
the formula MVt – (MVt-1 * (1+Rt)) + Dt, where MVt is the market value of the firm at 
time t, and Rt is the total shareholder return on the equity for the period t-1 to t.  We 
then estimate Clean Surplus Earnings as CSEt = Bt – Bt-1 –New Equity +Dt, where Bt is 
the book value of the firm.  In calculating the clean surplus return on equity, we 
assume any new equity is issued in middle of each year, so the Return on Equity 
(ROEt) = CSEt / (Bt-1 + 0.5 * New Equity).  The RIV formula now becomes: 
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where the long-term growth rate, gt, is again equal to the expected long-term inflation 
rate at time t.  With this model, in cases where the residual income is negative, we 
assume that the fair value of the firm is simply book value.  For this model, we drop 
negative book-to-market firms. 
 
We investigate two alternatives to the RIV models described above.  The first is a 
dividend discount model.  Clearly, this can only be estimated for the sub-set of firms 
which pay dividends, which results in a smaller sample.  In the absence of a 
consensus analyst’s forecast, the expected short run dividend growth rate for years 1-3 
is calculated by using the geometric average of the past five years’ dividend growth.
14
  
Where forecasts are available, we use the specific forecast dividends, but fill in 
second and third year dividends if missing using the short run forecast growth rates 
which are available.  In order to estimate the long run value of the firm, we assume 
that this short run growth rate reverts according to a linear pattern over a five year 
period to a long-term growth rate of 1.3%, which is UK long-term real dividend 
growth rate from Gregory (2007).  If the firm has a negative average dividend growth 
rate during our estimation period, we assume an initial real growth rate of zero.  
                                                
14 A shorter period is used where a full five year history does not exist. 
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Again, 5% is the assumed real cost of equity in the valuations for all firms.  This gives 
us Model 6 for valuation. 
 
Finally, we experimented with the forward earnings growth (FEG) model of Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), where short term growth is the consensus analyst’s 
forecast growth from year 1 to year 2, and long run growth is 1.6% plus inflation.  
Unfortunately, this model turns out to be capable of yielding some fairly wild 
estimates of value, that even with Winsorisation look unrealistic.  We therefore 
dropped this model. 
 
For all of these models, we then calculate a price to theoretical valuation ratio, such 
that values of the ratio greater than unity imply firms are over-valued.  To avoid 
implausible values
15
, we Winsorise the price-to-value ratio at the 5% level.  Models 1 
and 2, and models 3 and 4, turn out to be highly correlated with each other (perhaps 
not surprisingly), and give very similar results, so for reasons of space we drop these.  
Model 5 stands out from the other RIV models as having considerably higher price-
to-value ratios
16
, and although we show in an earlier version of this paper that we get 
similar results using such a model, we drop it here.  For the dividend discount (DD) 
model the mean price-to-value ratio is far higher than those from the other models.
17
  
These valuations may appear extreme, but as Lundholm and O’Keefe (2001) show, 
DD valuations will tend to be low when firms are growing, unless dividend payout 
ratios are adjusted to be consistent with g = retention ratio x ROE at the forecast 
horizon.  We have not attempted to do that here, so naturally our DD model forecasts 
will be conservative for “growth” firms.  Nonetheless, the DD model gives results 
broadly consistent with our other models, with the exception of the sub-sample results 
reported in Tables 6 and 7 of the paper, where results seem to show rather “noisier” 
estimates of abnormal returns leading to lower significance levels in the tests. 
 
For reasons of space, our reported results are limited to Model 1 (RIV requiring 
analysts’ forecasts at least one year ahead), and Model 3 (RIV but with estimated RI 
based on projected earnings if no analysts’ forecasts available).  We also report results 
                                                
15
 In particular, note that models 1-4 can potentially give rise to negative valuations if residual income 
is negative. 
16
 In part, because of our assumption that RIV = book value if RI is negative. 
17 A mean of 3.37, with a median of 1.37. 
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on the basis of a simple book-to-market definition, where book-to-market is a proxy 
for the inverse of Q.
18
  To test for differences in our univariate analysis, we use both a 
T-test (assuming unequal variances) and the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank-sum test.   
 
Summary statistics on these models are presented in Table 2A, where we show the 
mean price-to-value ratio, the standard error of this ratio and the median for both 
acquirer and target.
19
  Both of the RIV models, Model 1 and Model 3, exhibit mean 
ratios for acquirers that are significantly greater than 1.0.  For Model 3, this ratio is 
1.35, whilst for Model 1 (the “pure” forecast model) the mean is 1.16.  The medians 
are 0.98 and 0.90 respectively.  The book-to-market (BTM) model reveals that the 
average acquirer has a BTM of 0.58, with a median of 0.41.  It is also clear from 
Table 2A equity acquirers have considerably higher valuation ratios than cash 
acquirers, with the p-value being significant at the 5% level in the case of Models 1 
and 3.  The non-parametric analysis also reveals significant differences.  However, the 
difference in book to market ratios is not statistically significant, using a T-test, 
although the rank-sum test is significant at the 5% level.  Under the Q-hypothesis, of 
course, there is no reason to suppose it should be different, but note that this result is 
different from that found in Dong et al (2006).  Finally, given SV specifically predict 
that bidders in stock acquisitions earn high pre-bid returns, we test this using the pre-
bid BHARs at 12 and 36 month horizons.  Both cash and equity acquirers out-perform 
over the 36 months pre-bid, with the returns being significant using the Lyon et al 
(1999) bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-test, but at the 12 month horizon only the 
equity acquirers outperform.  Finally, as predicted by SV, the prior returns are 
significantly greater for equity acquirers than for cash acquirers.  However, given the 
properties of BHARs, it is arguably better to use a non-parametric test for differences, 
and the rank-sum test reveals both 1 year and 3 year prior abnormal returns are 
significantly different from one another using the rank-sum test. 
 
Turning to target firms, we see that valuation ratios are considerably less than those 
for acquirers, and indeed significantly less than unity in the case of Model 1.  
However, whilst in all cases the target price-to-value ratios are, as predicted by the SV 
                                                
18
 We are forced to use book-to-market rather than the more intuitive market-to-book ratio as we have a 
small number of negative book value firms in our sample.  Dropping this small number of firms from 
our sample does not materially affect our results. 
19 Results from other models are available from the authors on request. 
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hypothesis, higher in the case of equity offers, the differences are not striking, and are 
never close to being statistically significant, using either the T-test or the rank-sum 
test..  Targets as a whole show significant under-performance pre-bid, with the 
exception of the cash sub-sample at the 36 month horizon, where the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic just fails to be significant at the 10% level.  This under-
performance of targets is consistent with the SV hypothesis, although in contrast to 
the SV hypothesis cash targets show no evidence of pre-bid performance being worse 
than that of the equity targets. 
 
We further partition these price-to-value models in two ways.  First, we simply 
partition at the median, classifying firms as either “over-valued” or “under-valued”.  
Doing so shows that under every model (including the book-to-market model), over-
valued acquirers are significantly more likely to use equity financing than cash 
financing.  It is also the case, perhaps not surprisingly, that each category of over-
valuation has significantly higher pre-bid returns than under-valued firms, although it 
is perhaps worth noting that for every model at both 12 and 36 month horizons, mean 
pre-bid returns are never actually negative for under-valued acquirers.    
 
Our second, and more detailed, analysis is undertaken by classifying firms into 
quintiles based on these price to value ratios, as in Dong et al (2006).  This analysis 
for the acquirers is shown in Table 2B.  Dividing into quintiles allows the comparison 
of “over-valued” and “under-valued” firms, as well as an analysis of the central 
quintile, which under models 1 and 3 have price-to-value ratios not significantly 
different from unity.  Two features immediately stand out.  First, there is a significant 
difference between the propensity to use equity in the lower and higher quintiles no 
matter which model of valuation is used.  However, the result is only significant at the 
10% level in the case of the BTMV model.
20
  The difference fails to be significant 
using a rank-sum test, the p value being only 0.1249..  Furthermore, the proportion of 
firms using equity does not increase monotonically as we move from under-valued 
(Quntile 1 [Q5 under BTMV]) to over-valued (Quintile 5 [Q1 under BTMV]).  
Indeed, under model 1 and the BTMV model the central quintile has the highest 
proportion of equity to cash deals.  Whilst this latter does not conflict with the Q-
                                                
20 Similarly for the unreported DD model. 
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hypothesis, the results for the other models suggest that it may be principally firms 
that are under-valued that prefer to finance bids with cash, whilst those that are 
roughly correctly valued or over-valued use equity.  That said, SV (p.305) note that an 
acquirer that is valued more highly than its target would only make a cash bid if the 
target is undervalued even at the bid price.  This does not seem to be consistent with 
the evidence we see in Tables 2A and 2B. 
 
The second striking feature of Table 2B is that highly valued acquirers buy highly 
valued targets.  Under models 1 and 3, the target value increases monotonically as we 
move from under-valued to over-valued acquirers, and the difference between 
quintiles 1 and 5 is highly significant.  The effect is not completely monotonic in the 
case of the BTMV model, but is still significant.  In all models, as would be predicted 
by both SV and RKV, this relationship is strong in the case of equity bidders.  Less 
comfortably for either theory, it is also strong in the case of cash bids.
21
  However, 
this could simply be due to the fact that if markets as a whole are over-valued, then 
bid activity is more likely to be observed under both SV and RKV hypotheses.  
Because of this possibility, we control for market timing effects in our later logistic 
regression tests.  Last, note that whilst acquirer book to market ratios differ 
significantly between Q5 and Q1 for all models and both cash and equity bids, the 
same variation does not always exist for the targets.  Overall, target BTM ratios are 
significantly different between Q5 and Q1 acquirers, but the difference just fails to be 
significant (p=0.109) for equity bids under Model 3 using a T-test, whilst cash targets 
for this model only show a significant difference under this model using a rank-sum 
test. 
 
In Table 2C, we present the data for target quintiles.  This same effect is apparent here 
– expensive targets are purchased by expensive acquirers.  Note, though, that there is 
no relationship between the propensity to finance with equity and the value of the 
target.  In terms of target valuation effects, there appears to be no support here for any 
market valuation theory of mergers, nor for Martin’s (1996) risk-sharing hypothesis.  
For reasons of space, the results presented are simply for Model 3, but near identical 
                                                
21 Except when the DD model is employed 
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results are found under the other models.  In particular, we note that this also holds for 
the book-to-market quintiles. 
 
Last, in terms of the basic data description, In Table 3 we present correlations for each 
of the models between the price to value ratio, the value quintiles, the over-valuation 
dummy variable, the book-to-market ratio, and pre-bid returns.  For the acquirer, we 
see a strong positive correlation between pre-bid performance and valuation.  This 
effect is weaker in the targets and fails to be significant in the case of Model 3. 
 
Simple Univariate Tests of Valuation and Method of Payment 
Table 2A has already shown that the valuation ratio of equity acquirers is higher than 
the valuation ratio of cash acquirers, except in the case of the BTMV model, and that 
there are no significant valuation differences between equity and cash targets.  We 
also show that the pre-bid performance of equity acquirers is significantly greater than 
that of cash acquirers, but that there is no difference in the pre-bid performance of 
cash and equity targets.  Our next test, reported in Table 4, show the differences in 
price-to-value ratios between acquirers and targets.  Together with the results in Table 
2, these are the most basic tests of the SV model.  We should expect that for the 
equity financing sub-sample, acquirers have a higher valuation ratio than the target 
firms, and, as we have already seen in Table 2, that the valuation ratio for equity 
financing acquirers is higher than that of cash financing acquirers.  The overall figures 
show that no matter which model of valuation is employed, acquirer valuations are 
significantly higher than target valuations.  The equity sub-sample behaves exactly as 
predicted by SV, where once again, no matter which valuation model is used, 
acquirers have significantly higher valuation ratios than their targets.  To a degree, 
this valuation difference exists in the case of cash bids, although the statistical 
significance here depends on whether a parametric or non-parametric test statistic is 
used.  Under the latter, only Model 3 has significant differences between bidder and 
target firms.  The SV misvaluation hypothesis predicts (p.305) that cash bids take 
place when the target is under-valued at the bid price.  Whilst Table 4 shows that cash 
targets have lower valuations than cash acquirers, Tables 2A and 2C highlight two 
problems for this specific prediction.  First, from Table 2A there is no significant 
variation between the valuations placed on targets between cash and equity deals.  
Second, from Table 2C there is no significant variation in the proportion of cash deals 
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between lowly valued and highly valued targets.  Note also from Table 4 that for cash 
deals, the valuation difference between acquirers and targets in terms of book-to-
market ratios is only significant at the 10% level, and is not significant using the rank-
sum test.  Under the Q-hypothesis the book to market difference should be significant 
for both cash and equity deals. 
 
So far, target valuation excepted, the results are supportive of the SV hypotheses, but 
as Dong et al (2006) point out, they could also be supportive of the Q-theory of 
takeovers.  Under the Q-theory, acquirers have higher market to book ratios (a proxy 
for Tobin’s Q) than targets because they are more efficiently managed.  
Distinguishing between these competing hypotheses implies that we need to look at 
returns, and to look more closely at the factors that influence the form of financing.  
Accordingly, we now investigate these two issues. 
 
Long and Short Run Abnormal Returns 
The only way that we can reliably distinguish between the Q hypothesis and the SV 
hypothesis is to examine the post-acquisition returns of bidding firms.  Under the SV 
hypothesis, equity financing acquirers would be expected to perform worse than cash 
financing acquirers.  Under the Q-hypothesis, it is low Q acquirers which should 
perform worse than their high-Q counterparts.  Of course, if markets are efficient, 
then this effect should appear at announcement.  But the SV hypothesis is quite 
explicitly a misvaluation hypothesis, and the authors specifically state that it is the 
long run returns that will be negative (p.305).  RKV also imply a concern with long 
run price corrections (p.2688).  Although we report short run announcement month 
returns, we concentrate on the longer run BHARs to examine the competing 
hypotheses.  We choose 1 year and 3 year BHARs simply because the years of our 
study do not allow the computation of full 5 years returns for the later years in our 
sample.  Nonetheless, analysing 5-year BHARs where available generate results that 
are generally consistent with the 3 year BHARs.   
 
In Table 5 we report the overall mean and median acquirer announcement month 
return (acqar), the target announcement month return (tarar), and the 1 year and 3 
year BHARs for the acquirer (acq1bhar; acq3bhar). The first section of table 5 
reports returns for the full sample of firms, for which both Model 3 can be estimated 
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and for which BTM figures are available.  Note that, in line with other studies, 
announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero, and target 
returns are a highly significant 21%.  The 1 and 3 year BHARs are a significant -
6.76% and -12.46% respectively, with both figures being highly significant using the 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted T-statistic (BSAT).  As predicted by SV (and RKV), 
the equity sub-sample performs worse, with significant abnormal returns of -8.26% 
and -17.13% respectively, although announcement period returns are insignificant.  
For the cash sample, the long run abnormal returns are an insignificant -3.88% after 
one year and -3.86% after 3 years.  Target returns are higher in the case of cash bids, 
and significantly so using a conventional t-test.   
 
However, it is apparent that the sub-sample for which analysts’ forecasts are available 
has rather different characteristics.  Announcement month returns are significantly 
negative, and only the 1 year BHARs are significantly negative.  The 3-year BHAR is 
considerably smaller than that of the BTM/Model 3 sample.  This is troubling, 
especially as tests (not reported) do not suggest that it is primarily a date effect.
22
  
With the caveat that the Model 1 returns may exhibit some sort of sub-sample bias, 
we now turn to an analysis of these returns by over/under valuation, and by relative 
over-valuation. 
 
Table 6 reports the results when acquirers are classified into two groups based on 
model median price-to-value ratios: “over-valued” (which are the “high-Q” firms in 
the case of the BTM classification) and “under-valued” (“low-Q” in the case of the 
BTM classification).  The prediction of the SV or RKV hypotheses would be that 
over-valued firms should have the lowest returns whilst the Q-hypothesis could be 
interpreted as either suggesting the opposite, or at least should predict that high-Q 
bidders do not experience negative returns.  Tests for differences use the non-
parametric rank-sum test.  Model 3 results are reported in Table 6 Panel A.  Overall, 
the announcement period returns are insignificant, but the Year 1 BHARs are 
significantly negative for both over-valued and under-valued firms, with over-valued 
firms having a worse (but not significantly worse) performance.  However, the effect 
reverses slightly at the 3-year horizons.  Overall, it is difficult to distinguish between 
                                                
22
 Analysts’ forecasts are not available before January 1987.  Dropping the early years from our sample 
gives returns that are closer to those of the full sample than the Model 1 sub-sample. 
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the over-valued and under-valued groups.  Turning to the cash acquirers, we see that 
although none of the abnormal returns are statistically significant, the over-valued 
acquirers appear to fare rather worse (although not significantly so) than their under-
valued counter-parts, even though the target announcement period returns for this 
group are significantly lower.  However, the equity acquirers reveal a more interesting 
picture.  At the one year horizon, BHARs for both groups are significantly negative, 
with the over-valued firms having somewhat higher negative abnormal returns  
(-9.05% vs a return of -7.35% for the undervalued acquirers).  By the third year, the 
BHARs have reversed, with over-valued firms having a insignificant abnormal return 
of -13.65% compared to a significant -21.04% for the under-valued group, although 
the difference is not significant using the rank-sum test.  Over-valued firms also pay a 
significantly higher premium to targets.  This evidence is not actually inconsistent 
with the SV hypothesis, but it does require that we investigate the role of relative 
valuation, to which we turn after summarising the results from the other models. 
 
Model 1 produces results (Table 6, Panel B) that, as we note above, have overall 
higher mean abnormal returns than other models, but also suggest that it is under-
valued equity acquirers that under-perform.  This effect is also weakly significant in 
the announcement month for these firms.  However, at the one year horizon over-
valued cash acquirers under-perform, although the return of -6.94% is only significant 
at the 10% level.  By year 3, under-valued acquirers under-perform by a significant 
29.57% and the difference between over and under-valued equity acquirer 
performance is significant at the 10% level. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting results come from the test of the Q-hypothesis in Table 6, 
Panel B.  Looking at the overall results, we see that the high-Q (“overvalued”) 
acquirers have negative abnormal returns at the 1 and 3 year horizons, and that the 
difference in returns is significant at the 10% level.  It is hard to reconcile this with Q-
theory.  One could appeal to a rational risk pricing explanation, were it not for the fact 
that this sub-group earn far higher pre-bid abnormal returns than the set of low-Q 
acquirers (a significant +38.4% for the overvalued/high-Q group compared to an 
insignificant +1.8% for the low-Q/under-valued group for the year ending 1 month 
before announcement).  It seems more plausible that book-to-market is serving as a 
proxy for over-valuation rather than investment opportunities.  However, note that 
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low-Q/under-valued acquirers also exhibit poor performance, although it is less poor 
and less significant at the 3 year horizon.  Intriguingly, in the sub-analysis by 
financing we observe that after one year, both sub-sets of acquirers under-perform 
significantly, but the under-valued equity acquirers have an abnormal return of  
-9.12% compared to -7.51% for the over-valued firms.  Although the latter have a 
larger negative return after 3 years, the over-valued group is not significantly different 
from zero, whereas the under-valued group of equity acquirers is.  A further 
interesting result is that High-Q bidders are associated with significantly higher target 
announcement period returns than low-Q bidders, the abnormal returns being 25.02% 
compared to 17.15%, and this difference is particularly marked (and is significant) 
when acquisitions are for shares.  Of course, this is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the Q-hypothesis, in that highly valued acquirers (reflective of managerial ability 
under Q-theory) may be prepared to pay more to secure the best targets, but the 
finding fits more comfortably with a SV or RKV framework, where over-valued 
bidders have to pay more either to “buy off” target managers under the SV 
hypothesis, or to persuade target managers that the bid is worth more than their stand-
alone value in the case of the RKV model. 
 
Our last tests in this section investigate the specific prediction of the SV model 
(p.305) that relatively over-valued acquirers undertake equity-financed acquisitions of 
relatively less over-valued targets.  Accordingly, in Table 7, we report the results after 
partitioning on the basis of relative values.  An acquirer is relatively over-valued if its 
price-to-value ratio is greater than the target’s, and relatively under-valued otherwise.  
Turning to the Model 3 results, we see that the announcement period returns for the 
whole sample of relatively over-valued firms are negative, as they are for the equity 
sub-sample.  This contradicts the SV hypothesis.  However, the SV model does not 
predict an efficient market reaction on announcement.  Turning to the longer term we 
see that for the whole sample, both relatively over-valued acquirers and relatively 
under-valued acquirers earn negative abnormal returns (the former significant only at 
the 10% level at 36 months).  However, for cash acquirers, relatively over-valued 
bidders actually suffer negative long-run returns of -5.35% and -11.32% at the 12 and 
36 month horizons (both significant at the 10% level), whereas relatively over-valued 
equity acquirers have significant negative abnormal returns of -7.92% after 12 months 
but these just fail to be significant after 36 months.  By contrast, relatively under-
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valued cash acquirers have abnormal returns close to zero (actually positive but 
insignificant after 36 months), whereas equity acquirers that are relatively under-
valued have highly significant negative abnormal returns of -8.74% after 12 months 
and -23.06% after 36 months.  None of the differences in bidder performance are 
significant using the rank-sum test.  One point worth emphasising is that the long run 
outcome gives a different result from the short run outcome.  The results here are 
consistent with the market initially assuming that relatively over-valued bidders are 
signalling that over-valuation by bidding in stock, yet that subsequently it is the 
relatively under-valued firms that should not have been using stock to finance a deal.  
This long run outcome is entirely consistent with the SV hypothesis.  It is also the 
case that the target abnormal returns are greater in the case of relatively over-valued 
acquirers as a whole, and is particularly the case for relatively over-valued equity 
acquirers compared to relatively under-valued acquirers, where the difference is 
significant.  Again, this is consistent with both the SV and RKV hypotheses. 
 
We have already noted the possible bias in the returns for the Model 1 sub-sample, 
and highlighted the differences in long run abnormal returns between Model 1 and 2 
in Table 5.  Nonetheless, the results in Table 7 Panel B broadly confirm the “big-
picture” message with regard to the equity sub-sample from Model 3 in Panel A, save 
for the fact that the differences in target returns are no longer significant.   Despite 
announcement period returns being negative, the long run BHARs for the relatively 
over-valued equity acquirers are not significantly different from zero, whilst the 
relatively under valued equity acquirers show a significant negative 3 year BHAR of -
22%. Furthermore, the difference in returns is significant.  Although the pattern for 
cash acquirers follows that of Model 3, none of the returns are significant. 
 
Finally, Panel C of Table 7 investigates what happens when we partition on the basis 
of relative Q-ratios.  The Q-hypothesis would predict that the best performance should 
be observed by relatively highly valued acquirers, as these are the firms with the 
superior investment opportunity set.  By contrast, relatively “under valued” acquirers 
are those where, presumably, the target has the better investment opportunity set.  
Consequently, Q-theory would predict this should be the worst performing sub-group.  
The results are simply not supportive of the Q-hypothesis.  Overall, it is the relatively 
over-valued/High-Q firms that perform the worst over 36 months, although both 
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relatively over-valued and relatively under-valued firms have significantly negative 
BHARs after 1 year.  The difference in 3 year BHAR just fails to be significant at the 
10% level (p=0.1086).  In the short run, announcement period returns for the 
relatively under-valued cash acquirers are significantly negative which, whilst 
consistent with the Q-hypothesis, leaves us with the intriguing question of why it is 
only low-Q cash acquirers (rather than all low-Q acquirers) that experience negative 
announcement period returns.  Over the longer term, the abnormal returns for the cash 
financing group exhibit no significance, but for the group of equity financing 
acquirers we observe a significantly negative announcement period return of -1.42% 
and negative 1 year and 3 year BHARs of -7.13% and -19.9%.  This result is hard to 
reconcile with the Q-hypothesis, but straightforward to reconcile with an over-
valuation story.  Once more, any appeal to rational risk pricing has top overcome the 
fact that the pre-bid returns for the relatively high-Q group are far higher than those 
for the relatively low-Q group.
23
 
 
 
Logit regression tests of acquisition financing 
In keeping with the Dong et al (2006) and Ang and Cheng (2006) studies we 
undertake a logit regression analysis to analyse the method of payment.  Above, we 
have examined univariate tests, which is helpful in shedding some light on the 
financing decision, but a more rigorous method of testing the form of consideration is 
to run a logistic regression on the method of payment, where the dependent variable is 
equity financing.  Following Ang and Chen (2006) we investigate the issue of 
momentum in acquirer stock returns, but split it into two components – a general 
market return term, dmkt, the return on the FT All Share Index in the 12 months pre-
announcement of the acquisition, and acqp3bhar, the BHAR of the acquirer in the 
twelve months prior to the bid announcement month.
24
  As pre-bid abnormal return 
and the valuation metric are highly correlated (0.4 in Model 3, from Table 3) we do 
not include pre-bid abnormal returns and the valuation metric in the same 
regressions.
25
  However, we do include the dmkt variable as general market-wide 
conditions seem to play an important role in determining financing.  Our other market 
                                                
23
 The 12 month pre-bid BHARs are 24.2% and  9.7% respectively. 
24
 We also ran regressions using the BHAR for 36 months pre bid, with similar results. 
25 Doing so results in both variables becoming marginally insignificant. 
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timing variable is designed to pick up the effect of the underlying real interest rate, as 
measured by indexlkyield, the UK Government Index-Linked Yield immediately prior 
to the acquisition.  We also include the expected inflation term, inflation, as proxied 
by the difference between nominal and index-linked gilt rates.
26
  Our valuation 
variables are: val3(1)quin, the acquirer market value to RI value quintile
27
 in the 
month pre-acquisition from either Model 3 or 1; tarval3(1)quin, the target market 
value to RI value quintile in the month pre-acquisition from either Model 3 or 1; 
abtmvquin, the acquirer’s book-to-market quintile in the month pre-acquisition; 
tbtmvquin, the target’s book-to-market ratio quintile in the month pre-acquisition 
either Model 3 or 1; relovervalri3(1), a dummy variable = 1 if the acquirer’s RIV 
valuation either Model 3 or 1 is higher than the target’s RIV valuation; 
relovervalMTB, a dummy variable = 1 if the acquirer’s market-to-book valuation is 
higher than the target’s market-to-book valuation.  We include the latter dummies to 
pick up the SV hypothesised relationship that it is relative over valuation of acquirers 
compared to their targets that will influence the decision to launch an equity-financed 
bid.  We also control for target size and relative size using logrelsize, the log of the 
relative market capitalisation of the target divided by that of the acquirer, and 
lnacqcap, the log of the market capitalisation of the acquirer.  Last, we include the 
target announcement period return as a measure of the bid premium, tarar.
28
   
 
The results are reported in Table 8, where we run six alternative models: the two RIV 
models, and the “Q” model, and also the same models run on the basis of absolute 
values rather than relative values.  For reasons of space we do not report the prior 
return models, but note that (independently) both the prior 12 month acquirer BHAR 
and the prior 36 month acquirer BHAR are significant in explaining the issue of 
equity, although the Pseudo R-squared statistics are lower than those obtained from 
the quintile models.   
 
Turning to the results in Table 8 we can see that the 12-month prior return on the 
stockmarket is highly significant in the case of Model 3 and the book-to-market 
                                                
26 See footnote x 
27
 Note that including the price-to-value variable itself results in similar significance though somewhat 
weaker explanatory models, hence our preference for the quintile variables. 
28
 Using the target’s premium measured as bid price less price 1 month previously yields similar 
results. 
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model, but not in Model 1.  High real interest rates also seem to have an association 
with the likelihood of an equity offer, although the effect is marginal and depends on 
the model and whether over-valuation is measured in absolute or relative terms. 
However, periods of high inflation are associated with cash offers.  As may be 
expected, relatively large targets increase the probability of an equity offer.  However, 
the target premium never has any significant relationship with the method of payment. 
 
Turning to the specific models, under Model 3 we find the acquirer’s market to RI 
value quintile is a highly significant determinant of the probability of an equity 
financed bid, but the target’s valuation quintile fails to be significant.  The results in 
columns 4 and 5 show that relative value is not significant in determining the 
probability of an equity offer.  Rather, it is the absolute over-valuation of the acquirer 
that drives the decision to use equity financing.  This result on absolute valuation is 
confirmed using Model 1, but here we find that relative valuation is also an important 
explanatory factor, with the coefficient being significant at the 10% level.  When 
book-to-market is employed as the valuation model, a low book to market ratio is 
associated with a higher probability of an equity offer.  Furthermore, we observe that 
relative overvaluation is significantly associated with the probability of an equity 
offer.  As we noted in the univariate results section, one might argue that this 
tendency for high-Q firms to finance with equity not in itself problematic for the Q-
theory of takeovers.  However, a propensity for relatively highly valued firms to 
finance takeovers through equity would appear to be more consistent with the book-
to-market ratio capturing over-valuation rather than acquirer efficiency.  Furthermore, 
this finding is inconsistent with Martin’s (1996) risk-sharing hypothesis, which would 
predict that equity offers are more likely when targets are relatively highly valued.  
One further test of this matter lies in the relationship between equity offers and 
subsequent returns, once the factors that influence the decision to issue equity are 
allowed for, and it is to that issue that we now turn.   
 
Tests of long run acquirer performance contingent on the decision to issue equity 
The above findings clearly show that market timing variables, acquirer valuation and 
possibly relative valuation ratios, together with variables capturing the size of 
acquirers and targets are important determinants of the acquirer’s financing decision. 
Neither the Ang and Chen (2006) nor the Dong et al (2006) papers investigate the 
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long run performance of equity acquirers relative to cash acquirers.  Yet as we noted 
earlier this matter would seem to be critically important in comparing the SV 
hypothesis to the Q-hypothesis of takeovers.  Under the SV hypothesis, we would 
expect under-performance of equity acquirers relative to that of cash acquirers, but the 
acquisition itself represents the rational exploitation of over-valued equity by the 
acquirer’s management.  Under Q-theory, the equity valuation of the acquirer is 
rational and is reflective of the managerial skill and investment opportunity set of the 
firm.  As such, we would expect to see high-Q firms (that is, those with low book-to-
market ratios) performing better than low-Q firms, irrespective of the choice of 
financing.   
 
It is tempting to run OLS regressions to try and detect any abnormal performance, 
either in the form of two regressions for the equity and cash sub-samples, or one 
regression with a dummy variable for shares.  Indeed, if we do so we find that shares 
is a significant explanatory variable for all or model sub-sets, implying that issuing 
equity has a negative impact on post bid returns, which simply confirms our Table 5 
findings and those of other researchers.  Unfortunately, it turns out that neither of 
these approaches to assessing the impact of equity issuance is correct.  For example, 
Greene (2000, pp 933-4) shows that if we try to estimate the regression: 
 
iiii SxR εδβ ++′= , 
Where Ri is a measure of abnormal returns and Si is a dummy variable=1 if the 
takeover is financed by equity, in general the OLS estimate of Si will over-state will 
over-state the effect of an equity offering because of self-selection bias. The managers 
that select equity may do so because of factors that were expected to influence 
returns, such as overvaluation.  The correct approach here is to model the decision on 
financing using a first stage probit model, and then form a selectivity correction term 
(or “hazard” function), λi, which is incorporated in a second-stage OLS regression 
(Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2000, p.934), known as a “treatment effects” model.  We 
follow this procedure and run the model using the 2-stage treatment effects procedure 
available in Stata.
29
  For the first stage model we use as predictors the variables used 
                                                
29
 Note that in general, either a two-stage process or maximum-likelihood can be used to estimate the 
parameters of any selection model.  However, Greene (2000, p.930) seems to prefer the former, noting 
that the latter is “quite cumbersome”.  Nonetheless, we obtain similar results under a maximum 
likelihood procedure. 
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in the logistic regression, save for the fact we drop the target abnormal return which 
never comes close to approaching significance in any of the models run.  Neither do 
we report the relative over valuation model for either Model 3 or Model 1.
30
  In the 
second-stage regression we employ the 36 month BHARs, but Winsorise them at the 
5% level to reduce the influence of outliers.
31
  The point here is that if SV are correct, 
and managers are issuing equity in response to over-valuation, once that valuation is 
taken into account then the coefficient on shares should be zero.  As more a direct test 
of the SV hypothesis, we also form a new variable rightshares, which is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the acquirer finances by equity and its stock is relatively over-
valued compared to that of the target.  We hypothesise that the coefficient on this 
variable should be positive, whilst the coefficient on shares (which, in the presence of 
the rightshares dummy variable picks up firms who issue equity when their equity is 
relatively under-valued compared to the target) should be negative if the SV 
hypothesis holds. 
 
The parsimonious results from this analysis are shown in the first panel of Table 9, 
whilst the second panel presents the results from the first stage probit model.  The 
third panel gives information on the selectivity correction term, lambda.  First, note 
that the results from the first-stage probit model are entirely consistent with those of 
the logistic regressions reported above.  We drop the target announcement return in 
carrying out the probit regression as it never comes close to significance in the Table 
8 logistic regressions.  In the second stage, it turns out to be difficult to predict the 
post-event BHARs.  Perhaps this is not surprising given the inevitably skewed 
distribution of the BHARs, to which our Winsorisation only makes a modest 
reduction.  Whilst BHARs reflect the realised abnormal returns of investors
32
, they do 
not have the statistical properties that might be thought desirable for analysis in an 
OLS framework.  Before proceeding, it is perhaps worth noting that a simple OLS 
analysis for the full sample and equity and cash sub-samples suggests that a measure 
of the long interest rate on UK Government Gilts, giltyield, is a significant negative 
predictor of long run returns as are the target abnormal return (other interest rate 
                                                
30
 Simply because such models do not have significant coefficients on the relative over-valuation terms 
in the first stage probit regression. 
31
 Although Winsorisation only leads to a modes improvement in explanatory power. 
32 Subject, of course, to the usual caveats on an adequate risk-adjusted benchmark being employed. 
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variables [Treasury Bill rates and real gilt yields] fail to be significant), tapar and the 
log of the market capitalisation of the acquirer, lnacqcap   
 
At the 36-month horizon, the augmented regression shows that the UK Gilt fails to be 
a predictor of returns in any of the models, as does the acquirer’s market 
capitalisation, except in Model 3.  The target abnormal return is always a significant 
negative predictor of return.    One of our central variables of interest, shares, has no 
explanatory power in Model 1, but retains significance in Model 3 at the 10% level.  
Rightshares similarly behaves inconsistently in Models 3 and 1.  In Model 3, it has 
the predicted sign but only has a 16.4% significance level.  In Model 1, it is 
significantly positive at the 10% level.  However, we should note that whilst a Wald 
test on model 3 shows the treatment regression to be highly significant, the model 1 
regression is only significant at the 10% level.
33
  We can also test the joint 
significance of both the shares and rightshares variables in the above regressions 
using a Wald test.   It turns out that doing so reveals that we cannot reject the joint 
hypothesis that both coefficients are zero.  Whilst these results are not inconsistent 
with the SV hypothesis, strong evidence in favour of the model would have required 
consistent behaviour of these coefficients under both models, and for Model 1 to have 
a Wald test significant at the 5% level.    
 
Under the BTM model, we first report the results from the full regression used for 
Models 1 and 3.  Here, shares just fails to be significant at the 10% level and 
rightshares is completely insignificant.  However, under Q-theory there is no reason 
to investigate the role of a variable that hypothesises managers should finance with 
equity when the firm is under-valued.  Accordingly, we re-run the model without 
rightshares.  The result is that the shares variable still maintains its explanatory power 
in the augmented regression.  The Wald test is significant at the 1% level for both 
models.  Thus even allowing for the fact that the book-to-market ratio influences the 
choice of equity financing, stock acquirers under-perform significantly.  These results 
for the BTM model provide no support for the Q-hypothesis.  However, to the extent 
that book-to-market is a proxy for value, neither does the result that shares retains 
significant explanatory power, after allowing for valuation effects, provide support for 
                                                
33 The simple expedient of dropping the giltrate variable improves the p value to 6.24%. 
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the SV hypothesis.  For completeness we note that the unreported dividend discount 
model shows shares to be significantly negative at the 5% level but rightshares to be 
insignificant.  As with Model 3, the Wald test for the DD model is highly significant.  
Thus the DD model produces a result similar to that from the BTM model.   As a final 
check, we can also run a treatment effects model using prior 3 year returns, instead of 
any of our valuation models, as the dependent variable predicting the likelihood of an 
equity offer.  This confirms that prior returns have significant (at the 5% level) 
predictive power, and also reveals that shares has significant power in explaining 
post-bid returns. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have explored the SV and Q hypotheses of takeovers using a new 
sample taken from a market that has not so far been subject to a test of the SV 
hypothesis.  Most of our findings are broadly supportive of the SV market-driven 
theory of takeovers.  Proxies for acquirer over-valuation seems to increase the 
probability of an equity offer, even after market timing and relative size effects have 
been allowed for. “Over-valued” acquirers also tend to buy “over-valued” targets. Our 
finding that acquirers are more highly valued than their targets adds support to the SV 
hypothesis, but is also consistent with the Q-hypothesis.  We argue that the best way 
of distinguishing between the SV and Q hypotheses is to examine long run returns, 
since SV specifically predict that these should be negative for equity financing 
acquirers, although not as negative as they would have been if the acquisition had not 
taken place.  By contrast, the Q-hypothesis would predict that long run returns should 
either be positive or zero.  We find that for equity-financed takeovers long-run 
abnormal returns are significantly negative.  Digging deeper, we find that acquirers 
that are relatively under-valued (as proxied by an RIV model) compared to their 
targets have poorer long run returns than acquirers that are relatively over-valued, 
whereas for cash acquirers it is the relatively-over valued acquirers that perform 
worse.  This seems to be consistent with the SV hypothesis.  When we investigate the 
position of relatively high-Q acquirers, we find that it is high-Q equity acquirers that 
perform poorly in the long-run.  This seems to be inconsistent with the Q-hypothesis.   
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Given our finding that the form of financing can be predicted by valuation related 
variables, we argue that a treatment effects model should be used in any subsequent 
analysis of abnormal returns.  The results from this are simply model dependent.  
From our full RIV model there are some modest indications of support for the SV 
proposition that managers of over-valued firms may be acting rationally in buying 
relatively under-valued targets for equity, but we are unable to demonstrate strong 
support for this.  However, we find no evidence in favour of this using either a DD 
model or a BTM model.  Taken as a whole, our results leave us in the position of 
being unable to confirm SV’s proposition that managers of over-valued acquirers are 
acting in the shareholders best interests by exploiting that over-valuation to buy 
under-valued targets. 
 
Where all our models agree is in rejecting the Q-hypothesis.  High-Q acquirers 
perform worse than low-Q acquirers in the long run, relatively high-Q acquirers do 
worse than relatively low-Q acquirers, and in our logit regressions we find that book-
to-market quintile is a significant predictor of the probability of an equity-financed 
bid.  All of these are evidence against the Q-hypothesis.   
 
Whilst our results are generally consistent with the SV hypothesis, and by extension 
are supportive of the RKV model, there are some results that are not consistent.  First, 
we are unable to detect that any variation in the value of target firms has any 
significant influence on the probability of an equity offer.  Neither can we show, 
controlling for other factors that might influence the form of financing, that relative 
over-valuation always has a significant role to play in predicting the probability of an 
equity offer, although our results here are model dependent.  Of course, we have to 
acknowledge that our results are dependent on our valuation models being reasonable. 
To an extent we are handicapped here by the poor availability of analysts’ forecasts, 
particularly in the early years, which has required us to use our own RI estimation 
techniques.  Nonetheless, cross-checking with a dividend discount model confirms 
many, but by no means all, of our results. 
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One important caveat remains.  Under the SV hypothesis, managers knowingly issue 
over-valued equity to buy targets.  However, as an anonymous referee has pointed 
out, a plausible explanation is that the over-valued firms may simply be firms with a 
strong price run up, and that the managers in those firms are likely to suffer from 
hubris.  They will finance bids with equity to conserve financial slack.  Given we find 
a correlation between prior abnormal returns and over-valuation, and that prior returns 
also have predictive power in explaining the decision to acquire using equity, most of 
our results that support the SV hypothesis can be also interpreted as being consistent 
with this alternative “hubris”-type hypothesis.  The only way that we can see of 
testing this is to examine the trading activity of the acquiring firm’s directors.  SV 
specifically predict that there will be evidence of stock selling by insiders in over-
valued firms that finance bids by equity.  This test of the hubris hypothesis versus the 
SV hypothesis is a matter worthy of detailed investigation in its own right, and we 
leave that for future research. 
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Table 1:  Acquirer Size and book to market (BTMV) details 
Each year from 1985 to 2004, all firms recorded in LSPD are sorted on their market 
capitalisation in descending order, and classify all these firms into 10 size deciles, 
deciles 1 contains largest firms, while deciles 10 contains the smallest firms. 
Acquirers are assigned into their appropriate size deciles according to their individual 
market capitalisation in the year of acquisition. 
 
We also collect all the BTMV values for all the firms recoded on LSPD each year 
from 1985—2004 for which book-to-market ratios are available on DataStream, and 
divide all the firms with positive BTMV ratio into 5 group, with Group A contains the 
lowest BTMV ratio firm, and Group E contains the highest BTMV ratio firm. All 
firms with negative BTMV ratio are assigned into Group F. The acquiring firms are 
allocated into the appropriate BTMV group in each year based upon their end June 
BTMV ratios. 
 
 
Size decile Whole sample % Cash % Equity  % 
1 195 31.9% 91 43.3% 104 25.9% 
2 102 16.7% 41 19.5% 61 15.2% 
3 84 13.7% 26 12.4% 58 14.5% 
4 72 11.8% 16 7.6% 56 14.0% 
5 35 5.7% 6 2.9% 29 7.2% 
6 35 5.7% 8 3.8% 27 6.7% 
7 41 6.7% 8 3.8% 33 8.2% 
8 26 4.3% 10 4.8% 16 4.0% 
9 14 2.3% 3 1.4% 11 2.7% 
10 7 1.1% 1 0.5% 6 1.5% 
Total 611 100.0% 210 100.0% 401 100.0% 
BMV Quintile Whole sample % Cash % Equity  % 
A 196 32.1% 55 26.2% 141 35.2% 
B 127 20.8% 33 15.7% 94 23.4% 
C 88 14.4% 28 13.3% 60 15.0% 
D 89 14.6% 44 21.0% 45 11.2% 
E 103 16.9% 45 21.4% 58 14.5% 
F 8 1.3% 5 2.4% 3 0.7% 
Total 611 100.0% 210 100.0% 401 100.0% 
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Table 3: Correlations between model variables: 
 
Panel A: Acquirers 
 val3quin overval3 w5aptovmod3 acqp1bhar acqp3bhar acqbtmv 
val3quin 1      
overval3 0.8488 1     
w5aptovmod3 0.79 0.6328 1    
acqp1bhar 0.1971 0.1498 0.2502 1   
acqp3bhar 0.3031 0.2236 0.3984 0.4152 1  
acqbtmv -0.2846 -0.2073 -0.2725 -0.1314 -0.1917 1 
 val1quin overval1 W5aptovmod1 acqp1bhar acqp3bhar acqbtmv 
val1quin 1      
overval1 0.8482 1     
W5aptovmod1 0.8207 0.6583 1    
acqp1bhar 0.2039 0.1635 0.2496 1   
acqp3bhar 0.2863 0.1968 0.3837 0.4152 1  
acqbtmv -0.3056 -0.2214 -0.2869 -0.1314 -0.1917 1 
 
Panel B: Targets 
 tarval3quin overvaltar3 w5tptovmod3 tarp1bhar tarp3bhar tarbtmv 
tarval3quin 1      
overvaltar3 0.8488 1     
w5tptovmod3 0.9016 0.7491 1    
tarp1bhar 0.1 0.086 0.0982 1   
tarp3bhar 0.0669 0.0782 0.0654 0.5413 1  
tarbtmv -0.1214 -0.0794 -0.1189 -0.1707 -0.1427 1 
 tarval1quin overvaltar1 W5tptovmod1 tarp1bhar tarp3bhar tarbtmv, 
tarval1quin 1      
overvaltar1 0.8398 1     
W5tptovmod1 0.9141 0.7547 1    
tarp1bhar 0.1434 0.1122 0.1595 1   
tarp3bhar 0.2295 0.2089 0.2433 0.5413 1  
tarbtmv -0.1505 -0.1207 -0.1587 -0.1707 -0.1427 1 
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Table 4:Simple Univariate Test for Differences between Acquirer and Target 
Price-Value Ratios  For differences the tests used are the two-sample T-statsistic 
assuming unequal variances (significance indicated by *) and the Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum Test, (significance indicated by †). 
 
Overall Model 1 Model 3 BTMV Model 
Acquirer (a) P/V (or 
BTM) 1.167 1.347 0.532 
Target (t) P/V (or BTM) 0.907 1.043 0.647 
Diff (P/V a – P/V t) 0.259 0.304 -0.115 
P value PVa>PVt ***, ††† ***, ††† ***, ††† 
Cash 
Acquirer (a) P/V (or 
BTM) 1.053 1.202 0.582 
Target (t) P/V (or BTM) 0.896 1.004 0.648 
Diff (P/V a – P/V t) 0.156 0.198 -0.065 
P value PVa>PVt **, n.s. ***, † *, n.s. 
Equity 
Acquirer (a) P/V (or 
BTM) 1.234 1.423 0.506 
Target (t) P/V (or BTM) 0.914 1.063 0.647 
Diff (P/V a – P/V t) 0.319 0.360 -0.140 
P value PVa>PVt ***, ††† ***, ††† ***, ††† 
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